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THE LAW OF THE ROAD.
In 63 Conn. 150, O'Neil v. The Town of East Windsor, we
find an instructive and recent opinion construing a statute requir-
ing vehicles meeting on the highway to turn to the right; the
duty of a municipality to keep its highways in repair, and the
question of negligence. The rules of law applicable to the con-
duct of drivers of vehicles, and passengers upon the highway, are
few, direct and simple, and ultimately resolve themselves into a
question of negligence. The case first mentioned was an action
to recover for an injury to the plaintiff's horse occasioned by a
defect in the highway of the defendant town. The case came up
on the fa~ts found and reserved for the opinion of the Supreme
Court on the law applicable thereto. Chief Justice Andrews ren-
dered the court's decision:
"The defendant is liable in this action, if at all, only on the ground that
it was chargeable with negligence in permitting its highway to be out of
repair. And the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if at all, only on showing that
he is not chargeable with negligence contributing to the injury of which he
complains. Negligence is either non-performance or the inadequate perform-
ance of some legal duty.I This definition includes in it two subordinate ideas:
The idea of duty and the idea of the performance of duty. In any concrete
ease, whether or not- one party owes a duty to another, and if so, what that
duty is, is a question of law. Whether or not the duty, if there be one, has
been performed, is a question of fact. The idea of the performance of duty
suggests a further subdivision. What is the standard by which the perform-
ance of a duty is to be measured? When may it be said that a duty has been
performed adequately or inadequately? And may it be a question of law or is
it a question of fact? Doubtless there may be instances in which the law,
either, in terms or by the general agreement of the judgments of men, fixes
definitely the standard up to which performances must fully come to escape
the charge of negligence. In such-instances the standard of duty being deter-
minate, and so the same under all circumstances, may be applied as matter of
law by the court to the facts found in the case.2 These instances are not
numerous. In most cases the measure of duty itself varies according to the
circumstances which the case presents. The standard then is that of a reason-
able man;, what ,would a reasonable man of ordinary prudence have done
under the circumstances as they existed in the case? In these instances both
1 Halland's Jurisprudence, 93; 5z Conn. 392; 53 Conn. 461.
2 63 Pa. St. 17.
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the measure of duty and the extent of the performance must be ascertained as
facts.3 * * * That it was the duty of the defendant to keep the highway
on which the plaintiff was travelling in reasonable repair is admitted. Whether
a log lying by the side of and extending to or into the wrought part of the
highway rendered it unsafe and defective, is a question of fact to be by the
trial court determined.4
"So too the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable supervision over
its highways was admitted. Whether or not it had done so is also a question
of fact.5 On the other hand, the rule of duty imposed by law on the plaintiff
was admitted-that he must have acted with reasonable care himself. Whether
he did so or not is quite as clearly a question of fact. We do not understand
that the statute which provides that drivers of carriages shall turn to the
right hand absolutely bars one who turns to the left from all right to recover.
Such turning to the left would be a circumstance, and doubtless a very strong
one, which the court would consider in deciding whether the party acted with
reasonable care."
This decision is given at length because it is recent, correct
and concise. Turning now to the definition: A highway is a way
over which the public at large have a right of passage, whether it
be a carriage way, a horse way, a foot way, or a navigable river. 6
In Manchester v. Hartford7 we find it to include street, lane,
Kister v. Reeser 8 states that "road" is generally applied to a
highway, street, or lane. Bishop in his Non-Contract Law § i022
defines a public way to be every track or expanse, whether of land
or water, over which all persons are privileged to pass on foot or
in any land or water vehicle. More comprehensive is the defini-
tion taken from the cases cited:
"A public way, otherwise termed a highway, is any way,.whether upon
land or water, over which all the public have the equal right to pass, either
generally, or in a defined or limited manner, or upon a condition, or to trans-
port goods.9 The method and means used to build and keep up such high-
ways, and the persons or corporations charged with these duties, do not come
within this paper. It is enough to say that the several states have statutory
regulations in reference thereto, and such legislation has been and is of social
and commercial benefit to the several communities. Our present interest is
directed to the rights of persons and drivers of vehicles passing to and fro,
upon the road, whether for business or pleasure, where the road or way has
been built. It is the law of the road which deals with this particular question,
and this law has been defined to be thejaw regulating the conduct of travellers
8 6o Conn. 239; 4o Pa. SL 399; 59 Pa. St. 264; 5 Ohio St. 541; 35 N. H.
277; 4 Richardson Law, 329; 4 MCI. 242.
4 28 Conn. 266; 37 Conn. 414; 44 Conn. 1i7; 46 Conn. 213.
5 39 Conn. 222; 30 Conn. IIS.
6 3 Kent, 432.
7 30 Conn. 12o.
8 98 Pa. St. 4.
9 Bishop N. C. L. § 948, notes.
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as between themselves,10 and the requirement as the side of a highway which
drivers of vehicles, horsemen and pedestrians must take in order to make trav-
elling safe and easy." 11
The several States have enacted laws in this behalf. Their
general tenor is the same, differences appearing in detail, not in
principle. The Tennessee statute as to the side of the highway
to which vehicles meeting must turn reads as follows: "Every
driver or person having charge of any vehicle on any turnpike or
macadamized road, on meeting and passing another vehicle shall
give one-hhlf of the road by turning to the right so as not to inter-
fere in passing." The New York statute requires persons so
meeting to seasonably turn their carriages to the right of the cen-
ter of the road. Bicycles and tricycles come within the meaning
of the statutes. These statutes announce the American rule.
The English rule is directly contrary, it requiring vehicles to turn
to the left. Thompson, in his "Highways," considers the English
rule more reasonable, for "so long as drivers sit on the right" of
their vehicles, so long will it be more convenient for meeting
vehicles to pass to the left, as the danger of collision between
them is thereby lessened."
We cannot see where the difference arises. By the center of
the road is meant the center of the "worked" part of the road,
but the .center of the road when the snow is so deep as to conceal
the worked part is the center of the beaten or traveled track.'2
"Seasonably turn" has been construed to mean that the travellers
shall turn to the right in such season that neither shall be retarded
in his progress by reason of the other occupying his half of the
way when he may have occasion to use it.18
The result of the decisions on the requirement of the statute
to turn to the right is that whenever vehicles meet upon the high-
way each is to turn to the right to avoid collision or other accident,
but it does not require a literal adherence if such would of itself
produce the damage which the statute intends to prevent; it is
"for cases only wherein by reasonable anticipation of parties
meeting the following of it may avoid a collision, not for those
exceptional ones in which it would defeat its own purpose." Flagg
v. Hudson 14 was tort for personal injury by reason of defect in
defendant town's highway.
10 27 Pa. St 183.
11 Anderson's L. D. gog.
12 Earing v. Lansingh, 7 Wend. 185; 8 Met. 213; Jacquith v. Richardson.
18 14 N. H. 31o, Brooks v. Hart; Spooner v,. R. R., 54 N. Y. 230.
14 142 Mass. 28o (1886).
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
A lady and her husband driving upon the highway, the hus-
band holding a rein in each hand. Night dark and foggy. Turns
vehicle to the left to avoid danger of defect in the highway and
collides with a hack coming from the opposite direction. Held
that the defect was the sole cause of the injury and that an action
against the to wn should be sustained. "If," say the Court, "the
plaintiff's husband voluntarily turned the horse to the left to avoid
the danger of the buggy's tipping over, and this was done under
a reasonable apprehension that the buggy would otherwise tip
over in consequence of the defect in the highway, and the result
was the collision and the injury, the defect would still be consid-
ered the cause of the injury, if the plaintiff and her husband used
due care." Which is in accord with the principle in O'Neil v.
Windsor, supra.
The statute does not apply to the meeting of railroad cars
with common vehicles. The cars can turn in neither direction.
Hence, one travelling on a street railroad meeting a car cannot be
charged with negligence if he turns to the left; nor is the railroad
to be so charged by being on the left hand track.15 Common
vehicles have not the same rights upon the street car track as the
car and must get out of the car's way. However, the car must
not travel at an unusual rate of speed, and those having the car in
charge must act with due care. 16 Some States have statutes pro-
viding a penalty for any one wilfully stopping or obstructing the
passage of ambulances or vehicles used for the transportation of
sick or wounded persons or animals upon any public way.17 The
conduct of vehicles in passing in the same direction is also regu-
lated by statute.
The Tennessee provision reads: "When vehicles on said roads
are passing in the same direction, and the driver of the hindmost
desires to pass the foremost, each driver shall give one-half of the
road, the foremost by turning to the 'right, the hindmost by turn-
ing to the left." This provision relates to vehicles passing, and if
there is no other to intercept the driver may use any part of the
road which suits him; nor is one driver bound to turn aside in
either direction if there is room enough for the hindmost to safely
pass. In every instance due care must be used to avoid collision
and accident.1 s
15 51 N. Y. 295; 2 E. D. Smith, Ii.
16 76 N. Y. 530; z5 N. Y. St. Rep. 824.
17 N. Y. Penal Code, § 432.
18 76 N. Y. 530; 2 Esp. 533, 17 Barb. 94 and i Watts, 360 (which last gives
-the law in almost the same words as the Tennessee statute).
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Travellers upon the highway must have their vehicles and har-
ness in roadworthy condition, or are liable for any damage result-
ing from "insufficiency" in this respect. They have the right to
stop by the wayside for their own convenience, but must not
interfere with travel nor leave their horses unattended. The
statutory regulation requires persons so stopping "to turn so far
to the right as to leave at least one-half of the road free, open and
unobstructed for other travellers and vehicles."1 9 The statutory
law of the road relates to the conduct of persons driving vehicles
and not to that of foot passengers. The latter may use the road
in any way which suits their convenience, crossing directly, diag-
onally, or at any part. They have no priority in the use of the
road over vehicles, but drivers are held to strict care not to ruth-
lessly or negligently run over or against foot passengers. And in
their turn they must conduct themselves with such care so as not
to contribute to their own injury, or they cannot recover.20
As to travellers on horseback they are not required to turn in
any particular direction, but must act with due care under the
circumstances as they present themselves to avoid collision; and,
as a matter of custom, one on horseback yields the travelled way
to a vehicle.21 Persons driving upon the highway are held to a
greater degree of care with reference to children and persons
laboring under physical or mental disability than to ordinary foot
passengers.22 Whether or not the negligence of parents or guar-
dians, or those having children of tender years in their charge, in
permitting them to be upon the highway unattended is to be
attributed to the children and therefore bar a recovery against
travellers using due care, is a question decided both ways in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, and the cases are collated in a note to Hart-
field v. Roper23 in Chase's Leading Tort Cases.
Where a highway is obstructed the traveller may go upon
adjoining land, taking care to do no unnecessary damage, "pass-
ing as nearly to the original way as possible." A number of the
States have laws providing a penalty for owners of vehicles hiring
drivers addicted to drink. An action in damages also lies. More
care is required of drivers in cities and crowded thoroughfares, of
course, than upon country roads and sparsely settled places.
19 Tenn. Code.
2D0 41 Barb. 381; 8 C. & P. 691, 373; 96 N. Y. I4; IO8 N. Y. 349; 54 N. Y.
343.
21 24 Wend. 465; 2 D. C. (Vt.) 128.
22 25 L. R. A. 663.
23 21 Wend. 6x5.
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We have now touched upon the general rules regulating the
law of the road. And Bayard Taylor must have been thinking of
them when he wrote in his charming "Hannah Thurston" that a
remnant of aristocracy--or, at least, a fondness for aristocratic
privilege-still lingers among our republican people, and is mani-
fested in its most offensive form by the drivers of heavy teams.
No one ever knew a lime wagon or a wood sled to give an inch of
the road to a lighter vehicle.
Israel H. Peres.
MEMPHIS, TENN.
